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The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder versus Stakeholder Corporate 
Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa 
 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: South Africa (SA) has pursued distinctive corporate governance (CG) 
disclosure policy reforms in the form of the King Reports, which require firms to disclose a set of 
recommended good CG practices on both shareholders and stakeholders. This paper investigates 
the effect of the new shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosure rules on firm value, as well as 
the relative value relevance of disclosing good CG practices on shareholders versus stakeholders. 
Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 2007, we find 
that disclosing good CG practices on both shareholders and stakeholders impacts positively on 
firm value, with the latter evidence providing new explicit support for the resource dependence 
theory. However, we provide additional new evidence, which suggests that disclosing 
shareholder CG practices contributes significantly more to firm value than stakeholder ones. Our 
results are robust to controlling for different types of endogeneities. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper generally contributes to the literature on the 
association between disclosure of CG practices and firm value by specifically modelling the 
relationship within a unique institutional and CG environment. Specifically, we make two new 
contributions to the extant literature. First, we show how stakeholder CG disclosure practices 
impact on firm value. Second, we provide evidence on the relative value relevance of disclosing 
shareholder and stakeholder CG practices. 
Practical/Policy Implications: Our results have important policy and regulatory implications, 
especially for authorities in other developing countries facing socio-economic problems that are 
currently contemplating or pursuing CG disclosure policy reforms. Since our evidence indicates 
that additional value can be created for firms that provide more transparent information on 
stakeholder CG practices, it provides authorities in other emerging countries currently planning 
or pursing CG reforms with a strong motivation to formally extend CG disclosure rules to cover 
both shareholder and stakeholder provisions.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Disclosure Policy Reforms, Shareholders and 
Stakeholders, Firm Value, South Africa  
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INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the central question of whether differences in the levels of disclosure of 
recommended good corporate governance (CG) practices can explain observable variations in the 
market value of firms. Specifically, we utilise a natural and distinct corporate setting in South 
Africa (SA), where recent CG disclosure policy reforms uniquely require firms to provide more 
transparent information on a set of recommended good CG practices for both shareholders and 
stakeholders to investigate the relative value relevance of such disclosures. Using data on SA 
listed firms and 50 CG provisions from the 2002 King Report, we provide new evidence, which 
generally indicates that disclosing CG practices relating to both shareholders and stakeholders is 
associated with improved market value. However, we provide extra new evidence, which 
suggests that the positive association between disclosing CG practices and firm value is stronger 
for shareholder than stakeholder CG provisions. Our study thereby provides new insights on the 
moderating and intermediate effects of disclosing shareholder CG practices on the link between 
stakeholder CG disclosure practices and firm value.  
 The overall aim of CG mechanisms is to reduce agency problems by aligning the interests 
of managers and owners and thereby improving firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A major 
way of resolving such agency conflicts is for firms to engage in increased disclosure of CG 
practices.1 Specifically, past studies suggest a number of channels through which increased 
disclosure of CG practices can be translated into improved firm value (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2011). First, disclosing CG practices can facilitate efficient allocation of scarce resources by 
helping managers and investors to identify profitable investment opportunities (Bushman & 
Smith, 2001). Second, providing more transparent information on CG practices for shareholders 
can decrease the costs of external capital by reducing managerial monitoring and bonding costs 
(Beiner et al. 2006)  and consequently, the overall corporate risk premia (Mallin, 2002). Third, 
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disclosing CG practices can increase firm value by reducing information asymmetry between 
managers and investors (Sheu, Chung & Liu, 2010).  
 The results of recent studies generally support the above proposition (Henry, 2008; 
Renders et al., 2010). For example, La Porta et al. (2002) find evidence of higher valuation of 
firms in countries that provide more transparent information on the rights of minority 
shareholders than those that do not. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Durnev and Kim 
(2005) report a positive link between disclosing CG practices and firm value.  
A separate crucial policy question that has received little empirical attention despite 
generating extensive debate2 is whether providing more transparent information on shareholder or 
stakeholder CG practices contributes more to firm value. Stakeholder theorists (Freeman & Reed, 
1983; Slinger, 1999) suggest that disclosing stakeholder CG practices can, not only reduce 
political costs (Cheung, Rau, & Strouraitis, 2010) by legitimising corporate operations (Branco & 
Rodriques, 2008), but also, gain greater access to resources (Jensen, 2002) that can improve firm 
value. By contrast, disclosing CG practices relating to stakeholders imposes extra costs on firms 
(Friedman, 1970), which can impact negatively on firm value.  
In this paper, we contribute to extant CG disclosure literature by responding to recent 
calls (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; van Ees et al., 2009) for studies that examine both shareholder 
and stakeholder CG disclosure practices, as well as draw on multiple theoretical perspectives, 
including agency, legitimacy and resource dependence theories by providing empirical evidence 
on the central question of whether providing more transparent information on shareholder or 
stakeholder CG practices contributes more to firm value in SA. Similar to other Anglo-American 
countries, SA has pursued CG disclosure policy reforms following the collapse of Apartheid in 
1994 in the form of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
Distinct from other Anglo-American countries, the reforms require firms to provide more 
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transparent information on CG practices for both shareholders and stakeholders (Ntim et al., 
2011). This uniquely permits us to investigate and compare the impact of disclosing good CG 
practices on both shareholders and stakeholders, which is rarely studied. Hence, this study allows 
us to shed some light on the important question of whether providing more transparent 
information on shareholder or stakeholder CG practices contributes more to firm value, and 
thereby making a number of new contributions to the extant literature. 
First, from an agency theoretical perspective, providing more transparent information on 
CG mechanisms can reduce agency conflicts between corporate manager and shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mallin, 2002). However, since there are significant costs implications 
for corporate disclosures (Core, 2001; Dye, 2001), firms that commit to greater levels of 
transparency on shareholder CG practices distinguish themselves by sending a credible signal 
about their intention of aligning their interests with those of existing and future investors (Sheu et 
al., 2010). The positive perception of their CG mechanisms from investors can be expected to 
impact favourably on firm value in the form of increased share prices (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Consistent with agency theory, our results contribute to the literature by indicating a positive link 
between high levels of transparency on shareholder CG practices and firm value.  
Second, we argue that in developing countries facing deep socio-economic problems, 
similar to SA, companies that provide more transparent information relating to stakeholder CG 
practices can gain financially through increased market valuation. Legitimacy theory indicates 
that greater transparency through increased disclosure of CG practices that seek to protect the 
interests of stakeholders is a central means by which companies, particularly large ones, can 
legitimise their operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). On the other hand, the resource 
dependence theory suggests that disclosing stakeholder CG practices can provide access to 
critical resources, such as raw materials and government contracts (Jensen, 2002; Nicholson & 
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Kiel, 2003), leading to improved firm value. Consistent with legitimacy and resource dependence 
theories, we provide new evidence that suggests a positive association between disclosing 
stakeholder CG practices and firm value.  
Third, and most importantly, we provide new insights on the moderating and intermediate 
effects of disclosing shareholder CG practices on the association between stakeholder CG 
disclosures and firm value. It can be argued that the emphasis on shareholder primacy in the 
Anglo-Saxon corporate world on the theory of the firm suggests that disclosing CG practices on 
shareholders may be more important than disclosing stakeholder CG practices. Therefore, we 
argue that even though being more transparent on CG practices relating to both shareholders and 
stakeholders contributes to firm value, it is expected that firms with good disclosure of CG 
practices for stakeholders are more likely to also disclose more information on shareholder CG 
mechanisms. Hence, disclosure of CG practices for stakeholders leads to higher market value 
primarily through the provision of more transparent information on CG practices for shareholders, 
and thus the value creation is mainly through the disclosure of shareholder rather than 
stakeholder CG practices.  
Our proposition is based on prior evidence and investor surveys, which suggest that 
investors value disclosures on shareholder CG practices higher than stakeholder ones (Jamali et 
al., 2008; Starks, 2009). Our results contribute to the literature by providing new evidence, which 
shows that: disclosing shareholder CG practices contributes significantly more to firm value than 
stakeholder ones; and firms that engage in comprehensive disclosure of shareholder CG practices 
are also more likely to disclose more transparent information on stakeholder CG practices. Thus, 
our evidence, respectively, provides crucial insights on both the intermediate and moderating 
effects of disclosing shareholder CG practices on the link between disclosing stakeholder CG 
practices and firm value. 
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Finally, our results provide empirical support for theoretical suggestions that corporate 
board structures are the most important CG mechanisms (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996), as high 
levels of disclosure of CG provisions relating to corporate boards and directors have a stronger 
association with firm value than disclosures related to other CG provisions. Our findings are 
generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of 
endogeneity problems and firm value proxies. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the SA CG 
disclosure policy reforms. The following sections present the hypotheses development, discuss 
research design, present the empirical analyses, and conduct robustness analyses, with the 
concluding remarks containing a summary and a brief discussion of policy implications. 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE POLICY REFORMS IN SA 
The importance of good CG, accounting transparency and disclosure practices in reducing agency 
problems has been generally recognised (Mallin, 2002). As a result, CG disclosure policy reforms 
have been pursued in a considerable number of countries, although they have mainly focussed 
narrowly on shareholder CG practices (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). However, due to the 
need to address pressing stakeholder issues, such as mass unemployment and the legacy of 
inequality following Apartheid, CG reforms pursued in SA have distinctively focused on both 
shareholder and stakeholder CG practices (Ntim et al., 2011). This creates a unique governance 
environment whereby the impact of disclosing both shareholder and stakeholder CG practices on 
firm value can be explicitly examined. Therefore, our SA investigation is particularly relevant to 
stock markets in developing countries that are currently contemplating or pursing CG disclosure 
policy reforms where there is a paramount need to protect stakeholder interests due to profound 
social and economic problems.  
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Attempts at reforming CG and disclosure practices in SA began in 1994 in the form of the 
1994 King Report (King I) (Ntim et al., 2011). Of special note, the release of King I coincided 
with the collapse of Apartheid, the historic release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the 
subsequent assumption to power by the African National Congress (ANC) (King Report, 2002). 
Nonetheless, CG disclosure reforms recommended by King I were generally similar to those of 
other Anglo-American countries, especially those proposed by the influential 1992 UK Cadbury 
Report (King Report, 2002; Ntim, 2009). Table 1 summarises and compares these proposals and 
are also expanded in Sections 1 to 4 of the Appendix. However, and unlike the Cadbury Report, 
King I implicitly recognised the need for firms to provide more transparent information on CG 
practices for both shareholders and stakeholders by adopting the ‘integrated’ CG disclosure 
approach. The ‘integrated’ CG disclosure approach encourages firms to go beyond the traditional 
financial aspects of CG disclosure and take into account a number of stakeholder interests as well 
(see Table 1;  Ntim et al., 2011). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
  SA distinguished its CG disclosure model further from other Anglo-American ones by 
revising and replacing King I in 2002 with a second King Report (King II), which explicitly 
promoted the ‘inclusive’ CG approach (Ntim et al., 2011). The ‘inclusive’ CG disclosure 
approach seeks to maintain and strengthen all the Anglo-American (shareholding) features, such 
as unitary boards, voluntary compliance, and majority outside directors (see Rows 2 to 5 of Table 
1 and Sections 1 to 4 of the Appendix), but it distinctively requires firms to explicitly provide 
more transparent information on a number of affirmative action and stakeholder (stakeholding) 
laws passed by the ruling ANC on black economic empowerment, employment equity, 
environment, HIV/Aids and health and safety (see Row 6 of Table 1 and Section 5 of the 
Appendix). The explicit need to protect stakeholder interests through greater transparency on 
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stakeholder CG practices in SA arises out of many years of formal discrimination against the 
non-white population during the Apartheid regime, resulting in deep-seated socio-economic 
problems, such as acute poverty and high crime rate, despite relative economic development 
(King Report, 2002; Ntim, 2009). The requirement for companies to protect stakeholder interests, 
such as those of employees and local communities by disclosing their CG practices on 
stakeholders is, therefore, seen as a major way of addressing historical socio-economic 
inequalities between white and non-white South Africans (King Report, 2002).  
 Further to its unique focus on firms to provide more transparent information on 
stakeholder CG practices, a clear majority of the recommended good CG practices contained in 
King II seek to protect shareholder interests. These good shareholder CG rules cover four broad 
areas: corporate boards and directors; risk management, internal audit and control; accounting 
and auditing; and compliance and enforcement (see Rows 2 to 5 of Table 1 and Sections 1 to 4 of 
the Appendix). Boards and directors CG disclosure provisions primarily seek to improve the 
independence and monitoring power of corporate boards by encouraging firms to provide more 
transparent information on board practices, including having majority independent non-executive 
directors and splitting the roles of company chairman and CEO, amongst others. Risk 
management, internal audit and control CG disclosure rules call for greater transparency 
regarding corporate risks and their management techniques, and the existence of effective internal 
audit and control processes and systems aimed at minimising, as well as detecting managerial 
fraud. CG provisions relating to accounting and auditing call for high levels of transparency on 
accounting and auditing practices, such as adhering to international accounting standards and 
having independent audit committees. Enforcement and compliance CG rules seek greater 
corporate transparency through disclosures on the measures and steps that have been taken to 
achieve voluntary compliance with King II, including encouraging shareholder activism.    
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Additional to the pursuance of distinctive CG disclosure policy reforms is that, unlike the 
UK and US, but similar to some Asian and European countries, ownership of firms is highly 
concentrated (Ntim et al., 2011). Distinct from most Asian and European countries, however, the 
concentration has mainly emerged through the creation of tall pyramids and complicated cross 
shareholdings by a few extremely large corporations (King Report, 2002; Ntim et al., 2011). This 
is generally in contrast to most Asian countries where individual and family block ownerships are 
rather prevalent (Cheung et al., 2007). The feature of ownership concentration together with 
weak shareholder activism and poor enforcement of corporate regulations (King Report, 2002; 
Ntim, 2009), have greatly weakened the market for corporate and managerial control in SA 
(Henry, 2008); giving rise to a number of agency problems, including managerial entrenchment 
and expropriation of minority wealth (La Porta et al.,  2002). 
In summary, the recent pursuance of distinctive CG disclosure policy reforms, as well as 
the unique corporate context may arguably impact differently on firm value and as such, the 
association between the level of transparency on CG practices and firm value can be expected to 
be different from what has been reported in other Anglo-American countries. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Comprehensive Disclosure of Shareholder CG Practices and Firm Value 
A key question that has attracted considerable research interest is whether providing more 
transparent information in on shareholder CG practices can influence a firm’s market value. From 
an agency theory perspective, disclosing CG practices can influence corporate performance for 
shareholders in two main ways: internal and external. Internally, increased information 
transparency on CG practices for shareholders can contribute to firm value by reducing the 
divergence of interests between managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Chen et al., 
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2010). This can take the form of minimising managerial expropriation through excessive 
compensation and perquisites consumption (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Renders et al., 2010), 
preventing wasteful investments over paying dividends (Jensen, 1986; Beiner et al., 2006) and 
reducing managerial shirking (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Externally, providing more transparent information on CG practices can contribute to firm 
value for shareholders by facilitating comprehensive, credible and timely corporate disclosures 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001; Mallin, 2002). First, disclosing a firm’s contractual and CG structures 
can reduce information asymmetry and investor uncertainties (Healy & Palepu, 2001) and 
thereby reduce the cost of capital by lowering associated risk premia (Botosan, 1997). Second, 
and given that corporate disclosure involves substantial financial and non-financial costs, 
including litigation and greater public scrutiny (Core, 2001; Dye, 2001), firms that disclose more 
transparent information on CG practices distinguish themselves by sending a credible signal to 
investors of their governance qualities (Certo et al., 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2011).  
Third, disclosing CG practices constitutes increased managerial commitment towards 
greater transparency, integrity and financial disclosure by providing a window of opportunity for 
outsiders, especially investors, to continuously monitor the quality of governance structures, and 
thereby satisfying the need to directly observe governance and accountability mechanisms of the 
firm (Mallin, 2002; Sheu et al., 2010). Indeed, past evidence (Beekes & Brown, 2006) indicates 
that firms that depict greater commitment to transparency make more informative disclosures. 
Consequently, the main objective of CG codes that have been issued in emerging markets 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), such as SA, is that compliance will gain investor confidence 
by improving transparency that can facilitate better flow of foreign equity investments, leading to 
improved firm value (CLSA, 2000; Mallin, 2002).  
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 Prior evidence broadly provides support for the above theoretical propositions. A 
considerable number of empirical studies suggest a positive association between disclosing 
shareholder CG practices and firm value, although these studies are limited by being 
disproportionately concentrated in developed countries in Western Europe and US, which depict 
relatively similar corporate contexts (Baur et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2010). For example, previous 
US (Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005) and European (Drobetz et al., 2004; Beiner et 
al., 2006) studies report a positive link between disclosing shareholder CG practices and firm 
value, although others have highlighted the need for robust estimates by addressing potential 
endogeneity problems (Core et al., 2006; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008).  
Limited, but more consistent evidence has been reported for a number of emerging 
markets (Black et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). Black and Khanna (2007), Garay and González (2008) 
and Leung & Hortwitz (2010) have investigated the association between shareholder CG 
disclosure indices and firm value, using samples of Indian, Venezuelan and Hong Kong listed 
firms, respectively. Consistent with past cross-country studies in emerging markets, including SA, 
based mainly on the CLSA (2000) analysts’ CG ratings (Klapper & Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 
2005; Morey et al., 2009), the results of these studies indicate a higher market valuation for firms 
that engage in increased disclosure of shareholder CG practices than those that do not. Further, 
opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000), McKinsey (2002) and Deutsche Bank (2002) 
generally indicate that institutional investors, including SA ones, are willing to pay more for 
shares in firms that display greater levels of transparency on their CG practices than their less 
transparent counterparts even if they have similar financial performance records.  
A greater part of the CG disclosure rules contained in King II are aimed at protecting 
shareholder interests. Given the comply or explain compliance regime, it is argued that high 
levels of compliance with King II constitutes a major way by which SA firms can credibly signal 
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their governance qualities to investors and as such, those that commit to greater transparency and 
accountability in the form of increased compliance with King II can be expected to be associated 
with increased market valuation. Consequently, we predict a positive association between high 
levels of information transparency through increased disclosure of the recommended shareholder 
CG provisions (as defined in Sections 1 to 4 of the Appendix) and firm value. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis tested in this study is that: 
H1: There is a positive association between high levels of information transparency in the  
       form of increased disclosure of shareholder CG practices and firm value. 
 
Comprehensive Disclosure of Stakeholder CG Practices and Firm Value 
Despite generating substantial debate (Weimer & Pape, 1999; Slinger, 1999), the question of 
whether disclosing stakeholder CG practices contributes to firm value has received little 
empirical attention (Healy & Palepu, 2001: 406; Starks, 2009: 461). In this paper, we contribute 
to the literature by investigating the link between high levels of information transparency relating 
to CG practices for stakeholders and firm value.  
From a resource dependence theory perspective, providing more transparent information 
on CG practices for stakeholders can contribute to firm value in a number of ways (Jensen, 2002; 
Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). First, Jensen (2002) suggests that a firm consists of social groups in 
which each group can be seen as supplying the firm with important resources and in return, 
expects its interests to be addressed. For example, local communities supply the firm with 
location and local infrastructure. In exchange, they expect the firm to improve their quality of life, 
whilst employees provide the firm with skills and in return, they expect to receive a 
commensurate income, and this is arguably true for every reasonably conceivable constituency of 
the firm, such as shareholders, creditors, customers and the government. For instance, providing 
 12 
 
 
more transparent information on CG practices that seek to address the needs of employees can 
contribute to firm value by minimising internal labour frictions, such as strikes (Mallin, 2002), as 
well as improving corporate reputation (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). 
Second, and from a legitimacy theory perspective, through taxation, regulations and 
nationalisation, the political system has the power to redistribute wealth between various societal 
groups (Cheung et al., 2010) and as such, providing more transparent information on CG 
practices that seek to protect stakeholder interests, especially by larger corporations, can 
influence performance by reducing such political costs (Fishman, 2001; Faccio, 2006). Similarly, 
disclosing stakeholder CG practices can contribute to firm value by facilitating conformance to 
social norms and expectations in order to legitimise corporate operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008), which can further facilitate greater access to critical resources, such as government 
contracts, finance, and tax concessions (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003). Third, and given that providing 
more transparent information on stakeholder CG practices can involve significant financial costs 
(Friedman, 1970), firms that engage in greater stakeholder protection and disclosure send a 
credible signal to investors of their increased commitment to good governance and accountability 
(Certo et al., 2001), which can impact positively on firm value.  
 Limited anecdotes and evidence from the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature 
generally support the above propositions. Opinion-based survey conducted by Mercer Consulting 
in 2006, for example, indicates that institutional investors consider CSR issues to be important 
(Starks, 2009: 465). Also, evidence from the CSR literature suggests that increased CSR 
disclosures impacts positively on firm value (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008).  
As previously explained, due to many years of official discrimination, disclosing 
stakeholder CG practices is particularly important within the SA context, with affirmative action 
and stakeholder issues receiving greater political attention (King Report, 2002). Crucially, and of 
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particular relevance to basic materials and technology firms, securing and renewing government 
and mining contracts are normally linked to greater commitment to be more transparent with CG 
practices that seek to protect stakeholder interests (Ntim et al., 2011). This means that high levels 
of information transparency on stakeholder CG practices (as defined in Section 5 of the Appendix) 
may be a major way by which SA firms can gain access to valuable resources that can facilitate 
growth and improve firm value. Therefore, the second hypothesis tested in this study is that: 
H2: There is a positive association between high levels of information transparency in the  
      form of increased disclosure of stakeholder CG practices and firm value.  
 
The Relative Value Relevance of Disclosing Shareholder and Stakeholder CG Practices 
Another important question that has rarely been investigated in the CG disclosure literature is 
whether providing more transparent information relating to CG practices for shareholders or 
stakeholders contributes more to firm value. Our a priori expectation is that disclosing 
shareholder CG practices contributes more to firm value than their stakeholder counterparts to the 
extent that stakeholder CG disclosures depend on shareholder CG disclosure practices (Jamali et 
al., 2008). That is, although firms that are more transparent with respect to their CG practices 
relating to both shareholders and stakeholders are highly valued, it is expected that firms with 
high levels of transparent disclosure of CG practices for stakeholders are also more likely to 
disclose more transparent information on shareholder CG mechanisms, and thus the value 
creation is primarily through increased disclosure of shareholder CG practices rather than 
stakeholder ones. The statistical implication is that disclosing shareholder CG practices has 
moderating and intermediate effects on the relation between disclosing stakeholder CG practices 
and firm value. 
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Our proposition is supported by prior research. For example, Prior et al. (2008) suggest 
that managers who engage in earnings management are more likely to commit to high levels of 
CSR disclosures in order to reduce outrage from powerful stakeholders, such as shareholders. 
This can minimise the possibilities of managerial dismissals and reputational damage. Thus, 
increased CSR disclosures is largely an attempt by managers to entrench themselves by garnering 
the support of key stakeholders. Consistent with this prediction, and using a sample of 593 firms 
from 26 countries, Prior et al. (2008) report a positive association between earnings management 
and CSR disclosures. Similarly, and in a qualitative study, Jamali et al. (2008) report that a 
majority of top corporate managers interviewed in Lebanon considered disclosure of shareholder 
CG practices as an important pillar for the sustainable protection of stakeholder interests. This 
implies that firms that operate in the interests of shareholders through increased disclosure of CG 
practices are more likely to protect stakeholder interests.  
Also, CG disclosure mechanisms aimed at protecting shareholder interests are arguably 
more directly related to firm value creation than those that seek to advance stakeholder rights. For 
example, a corporate board that is able to effectively monitor and discipline managers can 
directly increase firm value by reducing managerial expropriation of shareholder wealth (Jensen, 
1993). By contrast, a firm that is able to meet employment equity provisions by providing local 
employment, for instance, can rather indirectly contribute to firm value, possibly through the 
legitimising effects on its local operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). Further, in a 2006 survey, 
Mercer Consulting reports that whilst 64% of institutional investors considered shareholder CG 
disclosures to be very important to performance, only 39% regarded CSR disclosures to be 
relevant to firm value (Starks, 2009: 465) and therefore, our final hypothesis to be tested is that:  
H3: Disclosing shareholder CG practices contributes significantly more to firm value  
     than disclosing stakeholder CG practices.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our sample is based on all 291 non-financial3 firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (JSE) Ltd as at 31/12/2007. We use CG and financial data to test our hypotheses. The 
CG disclosure variables were extracted from the annual reports of the sampled companies. The 
annual reports were obtained from the Perfect Information Database, while the financial data 
were collected from DataStream. The firms in our final sample had to meet two criteria: the 
availability of a company’s full five year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 inclusive, and the 
availability of a company’s corresponding financial data from 2003 to 2007 inclusive.4 These 
criteria were imposed for several reasons. First, and in line with past research (Henry, 2008), the 
criteria helped in meeting the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis, and its associated 
advantages in terms of having both time series and cross-sectional observations, more degrees of 
freedom and less collinearity among variables (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 2003).  
A potential weakness is that it may introduce survivorship bias into the sample selection 
process. However, the criteria still generated a much larger sample size than what has been used 
in prior SA studies (Klapper & Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009), and therefore, generalisation of 
the results of our study should arguably not be impaired by our sample selection criteria. Second, 
contrary to much of the existing literature that employs one-year cross-sectional data (Klapper & 
Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005), analysing five-year data with both cross-sectional and time 
series properties may help in ascertaining whether the observed cross-sectional association 
between comprehensive disclosure of CG practices and firm value also holds over time. Using 
the above criteria, the full data is collected for 169 out of the 2915 firms over five firm-years, 
giving a total of 845 firm-year observations from eight industries for our regression analyses.  
 
Variables and Measures 
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We construct three main CG disclosure indices in order to test our hypotheses. First, we construct 
a disclosure index containing 41 provisions aimed at protecting shareholder interests based on 
King II covering four broad sections: (1) boards, directors and ownership; (2) accounting and 
auditing; (3) risk management, internal audit and control; and (4) compliance and enforcement, as 
a proxy for disclosures on shareholder CG practices (CGSHARE). Second, our proxy for 
disclosures relating to stakeholder CG practices (CGSTAKE) is a disclosure index containing 9 
provisions that seeks to protect stakeholder interests based on the integrated sustainability 
reporting section of King II. Third, to test for the overall effect of all the CG disclosure practices 
on firm value, we combine the CG disclosure provisions contained in the CGSHARE and 
CGSTAKE to form the South African CG disclosure index (SACGI).6 These are detailed in the 
Appendix. All companies listed on the JSE are required to comply with the CG disclosure 
provisions or give reasons for non-compliance, enabling us to conduct our analyses. 
All the CG disclosure indices are constructed by awarding a value of ‘1’ for each of the 
50 CG disclosure provisions of King II examined if disclosed in the annual report or ‘0’ 
otherwise. With this scheme, a company’s total CG disclosure score in a particular firm-year can 
vary between zero (0%) to 41 (100%), zero (0%) to nine (100%) and zero (0%) to 50 (100%) for 
the CGSHARE, CGSTAKE and SACGI, respectively, with firms providing more transparent 
information on their CG practices having higher index levels. Although this simple binary 
weighting scheme may fail to reflect the relative importance of different CG disclosure practices 
(Gompers et al., 2003), we adopt it for a number of reasons.  
First, there is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical basis on which weights 
can be accurately assigned to the various CG disclosure practices (Black et al., 2006) and thus, 
using an unweighted coding scheme obviates a situation whereby the CG disclosure indices are 
unnecessarily dominated by a particular set of CG provisions. Second, an unweighted index is 
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transparent and easy to replicate (Beiner et al., 2006). Third, prior studies suggest that the use of 
weighted and unweighted indices tend to provide similar results (Botosan, 1997). Finally, an 
unweighted coding scheme is a well-established line of scoring CG disclosure practices in annual 
reports (Henry, 2008), and can also facilitate direct comparisons to be drawn with prior literature.  
The measure of market valuation employed in our regression is the widely used Tobin’s Q 
(Q), but as a robustness check, we employ total share returns (TSR) and return on assets (ROA) as 
alternative market and accounting-based firm value proxies, respectively, with our reported 
results being robust to both alternative firm value measures. To minimise potential omitted 
variables bias, we introduce below a number of control variables. Table 2 provides a summary of 
all variables employed. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
First, we predict a positive association between Q and sales growth (GROWTH), because 
firms with higher investment opportunities tend to grow relatively faster than those with limited 
investment opportunities (Durnev & Kim, 2005). Second, firms with greater investment in 
research and development can gain competitive advantages (Chen et al., 2010) and so, may have 
higher Q. By contrast, research and development is capital intensive (Henry, 2008) and as such, 
may impact negatively on current Q. Similarly, Jensen (1986) suggests that higher levels of 
gearing can increase performance by reducing agency conflicts associated with having excess 
cash flows by opportunistic managers. In contrast, greater financial distress associated with 
higher levels of gearing can inhibit the ability to exploit growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986). 
Also, due to greater agency problems, larger firms are likely to maintain more transparent CG 
disclosure regimes (Beiner et al., 2006) and thus, may have higher Q. By contrast, smaller firms 
have greater opportunities to grow (Klapper & Love, 2004) and hence, may have higher Q. Given 
the mixed literature, we predict that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and firm size 
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(LNTA) will relate either positively or negatively to Q. Third, firms that cross-list on foreign 
stock markets tend to have transparent CG structures, as they are subjected to extra CG disclosure 
rules (Black et al., 2006) and thus, may have higher Q. Hence, we hypothesise a positive link 
between Q and cross-listing (CROSLIST).  
Fourth, auditor independence and audit quality are positively associated with audit firm 
size (Barako et al., 2006), implying that firms audited by large and reputable audit firms may 
have higher Q. Hence, we predict a positive association between Q and audit firm size (BIG4). 
Fifth, we expect firms that voluntarily set up a CG committee to specifically monitor their 
compliance with King II to provide more transparent information on their CG practices and be 
valued higher than those that do not (Core, 2001) and thus, we predict a positive link between the 
presence of a CG committee (CGCOM) and Q. Finally, following prior research (Guest, 2009), 
we predict that Q will differ across different industries and financial years and as such, we 
introduce year (YD) and industry (INDUST) dummies for the five remaining industries.  
We present the empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, bivariate and 
multivariate regression analyses and robustness tests in the following sections. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Regression Analyses 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the variables included in our regression analyses. It shows 
that Q ranges from a minimum of 0.67 to a maximum of 3.58 with an average of 1.55, indicating 
wide variation in market valuation among the sampled firms. Our alternative firm value proxies 
(TSR and ROA), as well as our CGSHARE, CGSTAKE and SACGI also show wide spreads. For 
example, the SACGI suggests that the scores range from a minimum of 6% to a maximum of 98% 
with the average firm complying with 61% of the 50 CG disclosure provisions analysed, an 
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indication that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that SA 
firms attach to CG disclosures. Somewhat surprisingly, compliance with the 9 stakeholder CG 
disclosure provisions of the SA CG code is on average higher than with the 41 shareholder CG 
disclosure provisions, with mean values of the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE at 60% and 69%, 
respectively. The alternative CG mechanisms (BSIZE, BLKOWN, INSOWN and LEV), as well as 
the control variables, suggest wide spreads. This implies that the CG disclosure provisions and 
the sampled firms have been appropriately selected, and thus reduces the possibilities of sample 
selection bias that have arguably plagued much of the prior studies (Kapper & Love, 2004; 
Durnev & Kim, 2005). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 4 contains the correlation matrix for the variables included in our analyses to test 
for multicollinearity. Apart from the expected high and significant correlations among the 
CGSHARE, CGSTAKE and SACGI, the correlations among the variables are relatively low, 
indicating that no major multicollinearity problems exist. Of interest, and in line with prior 
studies (Klapper & Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009), the CGSHARE, CGSTAKE and SACGI are 
significant and positively related to Q, suggesting that increased disclosure of CG practices tend 
to be associated with higher market valuation. Additionally, there are significant relationships 
between the alternative CG mechanisms. For example, BLKOWN correlates negatively with the 
SACGI, implying that it appears to serve as a substitute for transparent CG practices. In contrast, 
BSIZE and INSOWN correlate positively with the SACGI, indicating that the three CG 
mechanisms are complements. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
   
Multivariate Regression Analyses 
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As firms tend to differ in the opportunities and challenges that they encounter over time, 
this can result in a situation where disclosure of CG practices and firm value are jointly and 
dynamically determined by unobserved firm-specific variables, such as managerial quality and 
firm complexity (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), which simple OLS regressions may be unable to 
detect (Kraatz and Zajac, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, given the panel nature of our data and 
in line with Henry (2008) and Guest (2009), we estimate our regressions using panel data 
estimation technique in order to address endogeneity problems that may arise from potential 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. We begin our analyses with a basic fixed-effects regression 
model specified as follows:  
         ni itiitiitit CONTROLSCGSHAREQ 110                               (1) 
where Q is the proxy for firm value, CGSHARE refers to disclosure of shareholder CG practices 
and CONTROLS refers to control variables, including BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, CROSLIST, 
GEAR, GROWTH, LNTA, INDUST, YD, and γ refers to the firm-specific fixed-effects, consisting 
of a vector of the mean-differences of all time variant variables.7 
Table 5 reports fixed-effects regression results of disclosing CG practices on firm value. 
First, we examine whether disclosing shareholder CG practices (CGSHARE) is associated with 
firm value. The coefficient of Q on the CGSHARE in Model I of Table 5 is positive and 
statistically significant, thereby providing support for H1 that there is a positive association 
between disclosing shareholder CG practices and firm value. The financial implication of this 
evidence is that investors reward SA listed firms that provide more transparent information on 
their CG practices for shareholders with higher market valuation. The economic significance of 
this finding is indicated by the coefficient of 0.007 on the CGSHARE in Model I, which suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in the CGSHARE, for example, can be expected to be 
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associated with 0.07% improvement in market value. Our results generally provide support for 
the findings of prior studies (Black et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010), but specifically to those of 
past cross-country studies whose samples include a small number of SA firms (Klapper & Love, 
2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009).  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Second, in addition to being more transparent with CG practices that seek to operate the 
firm in the interests of shareholders, firms may elect to protect the interests of other stakeholders 
in the form of increased disclosure of stakeholder CG practices, which can also influence firm 
value. We therefore re-run equation (1) by replacing the CGSHARE with the stakeholder CG 
disclosure index (CGSTAKE) in order to separately examine the effect of disclosing stakeholder 
CG practices on firm value. The coefficient of Q on the CGSTAKE in Model II of Table 5 is 
positive and statistically significant, thereby providing new evidence to support H2, as well as 
empirical findings from the CSR literature (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008) that suggest that the 
market value of firms that provide more transparent information on stakeholder CG practices tend 
to be higher than those that do not. The economic significance of this evidence is indicated by the 
coefficient of 0.005 on the CGSTAKE in Model II, which implies that, ceteris paribus, a 10% 
increase in the CGSTAKE, for instance, can be expected to be associated with 0.05% increase in 
market value. 
Within the SA context, apart from being part of King II and the JSE’s listing rules, 
stakeholder CG disclosure provisions, such as employment equity and black empowerment, are 
backed by statutory legislation, as well as receive great political attention (Armstrong et al., 
2006). Our finding is therefore consistent with listed firms, and especially large companies, 
committing to greater transparency, accountability and responsibility to stakeholders (Core, 2001; 
Mallin, 2002) in order to minimise potential political costs (Faccio, 2006) and legitimise their 
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operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). Such firms can be expected to gain access to valuable 
resources that can facilitate growth and improve market valuation (Jensen, 2002; Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2003). Indeed, the significant positive correlation between the CGSTAKE and firm size 
(LNTA) in Table 4 supports this hypothesis.  
Our finding also has direct implications for regulatory authorities in developing countries 
facing substantial socio-economic challenges, such as mass unemployment, high crime rate and 
widespread poverty that are currently contemplating or pursuing CG disclosure policy reforms. 
The evidence of a positive association between disclosing stakeholder CG practices and firm 
value provides a strong motivation for authorities in other emerging markets, such as those in 
Africa and Asia, that are pursuing CG policy reforms to extend CG disclosure rules to go beyond 
conventional financial aspects that are aimed at protecting narrow shareholder interests, to 
include those that seek to provide broad context specific socio-economic stakeholder needs.  
Third, and given the evidence of higher market valuation separately for disclosing 
shareholder and stakeholder CG practices, respectively, we expect firms acquiring high 
transparency values on CG practices relating to both shareholders and stakeholders to be valued 
higher than those that do not. Hence, we re-regress equation (1) by replacing the CGSHARE with 
the South African CG disclosure index (SACGI), which includes all the CG disclosure provisions 
contained in both the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE in order to investigate the overall effect of 
disclosing CG practices on firm value. Statistically significant and positive effect of the SACGI 
on Q is discernible in Model III of Table 5, thereby providing further support for H1 and H2. 
Overall, our results suggest that firms that commit to good governance in the form of greater 
transparency, accountability, social responsibility and disclosure (Dye, 2001; Mallin, 2002) are 
rewarded with higher market valuation, evidence which is entirely consistent with the 
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recommendations of King II, as well as findings from other markets (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Beiner et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010). 
Fourth, our evidence so far suggests that disclosing both shareholder and stakeholder CG 
practices contributes to firm value, but it is not clear whether shareholder or stakeholder CG 
disclosures contribute more to market value. In a regression containing both the CGSHARE and 
CGSTAKE, we will expect the stronger contributor to market value to dominate the other. We 
therefore re-run equation (1) by including both the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE to test for the 
relative value relevance of disclosing shareholder and stakeholder practices. The coefficient of Q 
on the CGSHARE in Model IV of Table 5 is positive and statistically significant, while the one on 
the CGSTAKE is positive, but statistically insignificant.8 This provides new evidence to support 
H3, as well as recent qualitative evidence (Jamali et al., 2008) and opinion-based survey (Starks, 
2009) that indicate that institutional investors value disclosures on shareholder CG practices more 
highly than stakeholder ones. Statistically, the evidence provides new insights, which suggest that 
disclosing shareholder CG practices has an intermediate effect on the significant positive link 
between disclosing stakeholder CG practices and firm value tested in H2. Its financial implication 
is that firms with higher levels of transparency relating to CG practices for stakeholders are also 
more likely to disclose more information on CG practices for shareholders, resulting in a 
reduction of agency problems through increased alignment of managerial interests with those of 
investors. The positive investor perception of increased disclosure of shareholder CG practices 
then impacts positively on firm value, and thus the value creation is primarily through disclosures 
on shareholder rather than stakeholder CG practices. 
Fifth, to investigate whether firms that engage in increased disclosure of shareholder CG 
practices are also more likely to make more stakeholder CG disclosures, we re-estimate equation 
(1) by replacing the CGSHARE with the CGSTAKE in addition to two newly created variables 
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(CGSHARE_Dummy and INT_TERM_Dummy) from the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE proxies. This 
test seeks to provide insights on the existence of a moderating effect of disclosing shareholder 
CG practices on the link between disclosing stakeholder CG practices and firm value suggested 
by H2. The CGSHARE_Dummy is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the level of the 
CGSHARE is greater or equal to 33 (i.e., if the CGSHARE is at 80% or higher), whilst the 
INT_TERM_Dummy is an interaction variable created by interacting the CGSHARE_Dummy and 
CGSTAKE variables.9 Our hypothesis is that if the value of disclosing stakeholder CG practices is 
particularly high for firms that also provide more transparent information relating to shareholder 
CG practices, then in a regression containing all three variables, we will expect the coefficient on 
the CGSHARE_Dummy and INT_TERM_Dummy in addition to the CGSTAKE to be positive and 
statistically significant.  
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient of Q on all three variables in Model V of 
Table 5 is positive and statistically significant. The statistically significant and positive 
coefficient on the CGSTAKE provides further support for H2 that providing more transparent 
information on stakeholder CG practices impacts positively on firm value. The statistically 
significant and positive coefficient on the CGSHARE_Dummy suggests that the value of 
disclosing stakeholder CG practices is particularly high for firms with high CGSHARE values. 
This sheds light on the existence of a moderating effect of disclosing shareholder CG practices on 
the association between disclosing stakeholder CG practices and firm value. The main financial 
implication is that the market value creation is mainly through increased disclosure of 
shareholder rather than stakeholder CG practices. Indeed, the high positive and statistically 
significant correlation between the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE in Table 4 indicates that firms with 
high levels of transparency on CG practices for shareholders are also more likely to make 
disclosures that are in the best interests of stakeholders, and we argue that the voluntary 
 25 
 
 
disclosure (Core, 2001; Dye, 2001) of such information could lead to the creation of additional 
firm value. The economic significance of such incremental value for firms with high CGSHARE 
is indicated by the coefficient of 0.003 on the INT_TERM_Dummy in Model V, which implies 
that, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in the CGSTAKE, for example, can be expected to be 
associated with 0.03% additional increase in the value of firms with high CGSHARE over and 
above the impact of CGSTAKE disclosure on companies with low CGSTAKE disclosure (i.e., 
0.08% vs 0.05%).  
Sixth, our results indicate that the CGSHARE is positively associated with firm value, but 
since it contains 41 CG disclosure provisions from four major categories, it is possible for the 
contributions from each category to firm value to vary, with some potentially contributing more 
to firm value and others contributing less. For example, given the fact that corporate board of 
directors is widely recognised as one of the most important CG mechanisms (Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996), it may be that CG provisions relating to the board, directors and ownership 
category contribute more to firm value than the others. To investigate this, we create four 
separate variables from the CGSHARE with each variable containing the respective CG 
provisions specified in Sections 1 to 4 of the Appendix as follows: CG provisions relating to 
corporate boards, directors and ownership (CGBDO); CG provisions relating to accounting and 
auditing (CGAA); CG provisions relating to risk management, internal audit and control 
(CGRMIAC); and CG provisions relating to encouraging voluntary compliance and enforcement 
(CGEVCE), whereby each variable is scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. 
To examine the relationship between each category and firm value, we first re-run 
equation (1) by replacing the CGSHARE with either the CGBDO, CGAA, CGRMIAC or 
CGEVCE at a time. The coefficients of Q on the CGBDO, CGAA and CGRMIAC in Models I to 
III of Table 6 are positive and statistically significant, whereas the one on the CGEVCE in Model 
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IV is positive, but statistically insignificant, implying that firm value is created mainly through 
providing more transparent information relating to corporate board structures, accounting and 
auditing, and risk management and internal control rather than via encouraging voluntary 
compliance and enforcement. To further investigate which of the four categories contributes more 
to firm value, we re-regress equation (1) by replacing the CGSHARE with the CGBDO, CGAA, 
CGRMIAC and CGEVCE together. In a regression containing all four categories, we expect to 
find varied contributions to firm value with the category contributing most to firm value 
dominating the others. Statistically significant and positive effect of the CGBDO, CGAA and 
CGRMIAC on Q is discernible in Model V of Table 6, whereas the one on the CGEVCE is 
positive, but again statistically insignificant. Consistent with existing theory (Jensen, 1993), the 
coefficient on the CGBDO is larger in magnitude, statistical and economic significance, 
indicating that comprehensive disclosure of corporate board mechanisms contributes more to firm 
value than the other three CG disclosure practices.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Finally, the coefficients on the control variables in Models I to V of Tables 5 and 6 
generally show the predicted signs. For example, and as hypothesised, BIG4, CROSLIST and 
GROWTH are statistically significant and positively associated with Q, while the coefficient on 
LNTA is negative and significantly related to Q in all 10 models investigated.  
 
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
Our regression analyses so far do not take into account the possible existence of endogeneity 
problems and CG disclosure weighting scheme. The positive association between our 
comprehensive CG disclosure indices and firm value, for example, could consequently be 
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misleading. In this section, we examine how sensitive our results are to the presence of 
endogenous relationships and alternative CG disclosure weighting scheme. 
 
Endogeneity Problems, Lagged Structure and Two-Stage Least Squares 
As briefly noted previously, the presence of endogeneity problems can significantly affect 
empirical findings (Core et al., 2006). Generally, a variable is classified as endogenous if it is 
correlated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2002: 50), and arises mainly from omitted variable 
bias and simultaneity (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010: 186). With respect to our investigation, the 
endogeneity problem arises if the SACGI assumed to be exogenous in equation (1) is correlated 
with the error term ( ), in which case fixed-effects estimates may be biased and inconsistent. 
Omitted variable endogeneity arises if a relevant control variable is, for example, omitted from 
equation (1) due to data unavailability (Wooldridge, 2002: 50). Black et al. (2006) suggest, for 
instance, that firms may selectively appoint non-executive directors just to signal managers’ 
intent to treat outside investors fairly, even though non-executive directors in practice may not be 
effective in monitoring and disciplining managers. Our SACGI will in this case wrongly proxy 
for an omitted variable (managers’ intent). On the other hand, simultaneity arises if the 
independent variable is also simultaneously determined by the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 
2002: 51). While we have assumed that firms providing more transparent information relating to 
their CG practices (higher SACGI scores) will be valued more highly, it may be that firms with 
higher market values (Q) are rather more likely to disclose more transparent information on their 
CG mechanisms, because they have better investment opportunities and rely more on external 
financing (Beiner et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010). 
 Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we address these potential endogeneity problems 
in a number of ways, including by estimating: a lagged firm value-CG disclosure practices 
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structure and two-stage least squares (2SLS). First, and as noted previously, to address 
simultaneity problems that may arise due to the existence of a lagged CG disclosure practices and 
Q association, we follow prior research (Renders et al., 2010) to re-estimate equation (1) as a 
lagged structure specified as:  
                            ni itiitiitit CONTROLSCGSHAREQ 1 11110                             (2) 
where everything remains the same as defined in equation (1) except that we introduce a one year 
lag between Q and the CG disclosure indices (CGSHARE, CGSTAKE or SACGI) in which current 
year’s Q depends on previous year’s CG disclosure practices. Statistically significant and positive 
coefficient of Qt+110 on the CGSHAREt, CGSTAKEt and SACGIt is easily discernible in Models I 
to III of Table 7. While the magnitude of the lagged coefficients have slightly decreased, they are 
generally similar to those reported for Models I to III in Table 5, thereby indicating that our 
initial evidence of a positive association between firm value and CG disclosure index is robust to 
estimating a lagged structure. The similarity of the results from estimating lagged and un-lagged 
structures also suggests that time-series variation in the CG disclosure indices and Q is small.   
Insert Table 7 about here 
Second, to address endogeneity problems that may be caused by omitted variable bias, we 
adopt the widely used 2SLS technique (Black et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). However, to ensure that 
the 2SLS technique is appropriate, and following Beiner et al. (2006) and Larcker and Rusticus 
(2010), we first carried out the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (see Beiner et al., 2006: 267; 
Larcker & Rusticus, 2010: 191) to test for the existence of an endogenous relationship between 
the SACGI and Q. Applied to equation (1) where the CGSHARE is replaced with the SACGI (i.e., 
Model III of Table 5), the test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 5% level. Thus, 
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we conclude that the 2SLS technique is appropriate and that our fixed-effects results may be 
spurious (biased and inconsistent). 
 In the first stage, we assume that the SACGI will be determined by the nine control 
variables and four alternative CG mechanisms. Due to greater agency problems, higher political 
and financial costs, and greater public scrutiny, larger firms are more likely to make more 
transparent CG disclosures (Beiner et al., 2006) and as such, we expect the size related variables, 
including BIG4 and LNTA to be positively associated with the SACGI. Cross-listed firms are 
more likely to provide more transparent information on their CG practices as they tend to be 
subjected to additional accounting, CG and disclosure rules (Klapper & Love, 2004; Renders et 
al., 2010) and therefore, we hypothesise a positive link between CROSLIST and the SACGI. 
Firms with greater investment and growth opportunities will be expected to make comprehensive 
CG disclosures in order to attract cheaper external capital, including debt (Beiner et al., 2006; 
Chen et al., 2010) and hence, we predict that CAPEX, GEAR, GROWTH and LEV will correlate 
positively with the SACGI. We predict a positive association between CGCOM and the SACGI 
since firms that voluntarily set up a CG committee to specifically monitor compliance with CG 
rules can be expected to maintain high levels of transparency relating to their CG practices (Core, 
2001; Ntim et al., 2011). Greater independence and monitoring power associated with larger 
boards can motivate managers to engage in comprehensive CG disclosures (Sheu et al., 2010) 
and hence, we expect BSIZE to correlate positively with the SACGI. We hypothesise a negative 
link between BLKOWN and the SACGI because higher BLKOWN can act as a substitute for 
comprehensive CG disclosure practices by reducing agency problems through closer managerial 
monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Due to their financial and information advantages (Core, 
2001), INSOWN can impact positively on comprehensive disclosure of CG practices and thus, we 
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expect INSOWN to be positively related to the SACGI. We also expect the SACGI to differ across 
INDUST and YD and therefore, the first stage regression to be estimated is specified as: 
                                

n
i
ititiit
itititit
CONTROLSLEV
INSOWNBLKOWNBSIZESACGI
1
4
3210 

                          (3) 
 Consistent with our predictions and evidence contained in Table 4, statistically significant 
and positive coefficient of the SACGI on BSIZE, INSOWN, LEV, BIG4, CROSLIST, GEAR and 
LNTA is noticeable in Model IV of Table 7, whereas the one on BLKOWN is negative and 
statistically significant. The consistency of the coefficients in relation to the hypothesised signs 
and the good regression diagnostics, including the fairly high adjusted R2 and F-value 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010) in Model IV appear to suggest that the predicted 
SACGI (i.e., the instrumented part of the SACGI) is an appropriate instrument for the SACGI. We 
therefore re-estimate equation (1) specified as: 
                                ni ititiitit CONTROLSSACGIPQ 110 _ˆ                                        (4) 
where everything remains the same as defined in equation (1) except that we use the predicted 
SACGI (P_SACGI) from equation (3) as instrument for the SACGI. Statistically significant and 
positive effect of the P_SACGI on Q is discernible in Model V of Table 7, thereby implying that 
our evidence of a positive association between comprehensive disclosure of CG practices and 
firm value is not significantly sensitive to endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted 
variables. The slight increase in the coefficient (0.011) on the P_SACGI compared with the one 
(0.009) on the SACGI in Model III of Table 5 is generally consistent with previous evidence that 
instrumented parts of comprehensive CG disclosure practices tend to predict Q more strongly 
than the un-instrumented parts (Beiner et al. 2006; Black et al., 2006).  
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Alternative CG Disclosure Index Weighting Scheme 
We conduct an additional sensitivity analysis, specifically relating to alternative CG disclosure 
weighting scheme. Similar to Beiner et al. (2006), we examine whether our results depend on the 
weighting of the five sections of our SACGI. As previously noted, all 50 CG disclosure 
provisions forming the SACGI are equally weighted, but the number of CG disclosure provisions 
varies across the five sections. Thus, this simple equal weighting scheme results in different 
weights being assigned to each of the five sections: CGBDO (54%), CGAA (12%), CGRMIAC 
(10%), CGEVCE (6%) and CGSTAKE (18%). To ascertain whether our results are sensitive to 
the weighting of the five sections, we construct alternative comprehensive CG disclosure indices 
for the CGSHARE, CGSTAKE and SACGI, defined as weighted CG disclosure index, in which 
each of the five sections is awarded equal weight of 20%. Our results, which for brevity are not 
reported in full, (but available upon request), indicate that the coefficients on the alternatively 
weighted CGSHARE, CGSTAKE and SACGI in the analysis of the cross-sectional variation in Q 
are positive (0.009, 0.007 and 0.011, respectively) and statistically significant, suggesting that our 
results are robust to this alternative weighting scheme. 
  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the impact on market value of disclosing a set of recommended good 
corporate governance (CG) practices using data on 169 South African (SA) listed firms from 
2002 to 2007. This coincides with a period during which the SA authorities introduced CG 
disclosure policy reforms that uniquely require firms to provide more transparent information 
relating to good CG practices for both shareholders and stakeholders. This allows us to 
distinctively investigate the effect of disclosing shareholder and stakeholder CG practices on firm 
value, in addition to examining the relative value relevance of disclosing good CG practices on 
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shareholders versus stakeholders. Our study, therefore, extends, as well as makes, a number of 
new contributions to the extant literature.  
First, agency theory suggests that disclosing shareholder CG practices can reduce agency 
problems by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Mallin, 2002). As disclosure of CG practices involves significant costs (Core, 2001; Dye, 2001), 
firms with high levels of information transparency on CG practices for shareholders send a 
distinctive and credible signal of increased alignment of their interests with those of investors. 
The positive view of investors of CG practices can then be expected to impact favourably on firm 
value through increased share prices (La Porta et al., 2002; Sheu et al., 2010). Consistent with 
agency theory and the findings of prior studies (Klapper & Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005), 
our results contribute to the literature by suggesting a positive relation between disclosing 
shareholder CG practices and firm value.  
Second, we suggest that in emerging countries, such as SA facing profound socio-
economic challenges, firms that protect the interests of stakeholders by engaging in increased 
disclosure of stakeholder CG practices can gain additional firm value. From a legitimacy 
theoretical view, disclosure of CG practices that seek to protect stakeholder interests, including 
employees and government, is a major way by which corporations can legitimise their operations 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). On the other hand, resource dependence theory indicates that 
disclosing stakeholder CG practices can facilitate access to critical resources (Jensen, 2002; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2003), which can result in improved firm value. Consistent with legitimacy 
and resource dependence theoretical predictions, we provide new evidence that suggests that 
disclosing stakeholder CG practices impacts positively on firm value. Our evidence also provides 
support for the findings of recent opinion-based institutional investor survey (Starks, 2009), as 
well as empirical evidence from the corporate social responsibility literature (Branco & 
 33 
 
 
Rodrigues, 2008). Within the SA corporate context, our results suggest that greater commitment 
to increased transparency, accountability and responsibility to stakeholders appears to be a major 
way by which listed firms can reduce political costs and also gain access to resources to facilitate 
growth and improve firm value.  
Third, we provide new insights on the moderating and intermediate effects of providing 
more transparent information on shareholder CG practices on the relation between disclosing 
stakeholder CG practices and firm value. We suggest that although disclosing CG practices on 
both shareholders and stakeholders contributes to firm value, our expectation is that companies 
that provide more transparent information on stakeholder CG mechanisms are also more likely to 
disclose more transparent information on shareholder CG practices. Therefore, disclosing 
stakeholder CG practices impacts positively on market value mainly through disclosing 
shareholder CG practices, and hence the value creation is mainly through providing more 
transparent information on CG practices for shareholders instead of stakeholders.  
Our results make two new contributions to the extant literature by indicating that: 
providing more transparent information on shareholder CG practices contributes significantly 
more to firm value than their stakeholder counterparts; and companies with high levels of 
disclosure relating to shareholder CG practices are also more likely to protect the interests of 
stakeholders in the form of increased disclosure of stakeholder CG practices. Hence, our evidence, 
respectively, provides important insights on both the intermediate and moderating effects of 
disclosing shareholder CG practices on the association between disclosing stakeholder CG 
practices and firm value. It also provides support for prior evidence that suggests that institutional 
investors value shareholder CG practices higher than stakeholder ones (Jamali et al., 2008; Starks, 
2009), as well as offers an empirical dimension to the debate on whether disclosing shareholder 
or stakeholder CG practices contributes more to firm value (Friedman, 1970; Letza et al., 2004). 
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Fourth, agency theory suggests that corporate board structures are one of the most 
important CG disclosure mechanisms that can effectively reduce agency conflicts between 
mangers and shareholders in modern corporations (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Our results 
contribute to literature by suggesting further that providing more transparent information on CG 
provisions relating to corporate boards and directors have a stronger association with firm value 
than other provisions. Our findings are generally robust across a number of econometric models 
that control for different types of endogeneity problems and weighting schemes, as well as 
different types of firm value proxies. 
Fifth, our results have important policy, regulatory and practical implications, especially 
for companies, governments and authorities in other developing countries that are currently 
pursuing CG disclosure policy reforms. With respect to governments and regulatory authorities, 
given our evidence of a positive association between high levels of information transparency 
relating to CG practices for stakeholders and firm value, it provides them with a strong 
motivation to pursue CG policy reforms that formally extend CG disclosure rules to go beyond 
conventional financial aspects that are aimed at protecting narrow shareholder interests to include 
those that seek to provide broad context specific socio-economic stakeholder needs. Specifically, 
and given the context, it is suggested that CG policy reforms should explicitly seek to cover CG 
provisions that are equally relevant to both shareholders and other key corporate stakeholders, 
such as employees, communities, customers, creditors and suppliers. In the case of corporations, 
our evidence that listed companies can gain additional financial value by providing more 
transparent information on stakeholder CG practices implies that listed firms may need to pay 
serious attention to stakeholder CG practices and also in preparing the sustainability report.  
Further, our evidence offers potential theoretical and empirical avenues for future 
research. With regards to theoretical extensions, our evidence implies that future studies can 
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potentially enrich their theoretical bases by drawing on the rich insights offered by other relevant, 
but rarely used CG theories, such as stakeholder and political cost to complement agency theory 
when investigating the financial implications of stakeholder CG disclosure practices (see 
Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). In terms of empirical expansions, and given our focus on an Anglo-
American CG model within a developing African context, our evidence paves the way for future 
studies that can explore the valuation consequences of disclosing stakeholder CG practices in 
different international governance environments. These may include: developed Anglo-American 
contexts that rely mainly on formal governance rules; Western European and Asian economies 
that depend mostly on informal mechanisms and concentrated ownership; Scandinavian nations 
that rely primarily on social norms and trust; transition economies that depend mainly on 
statutory rules; and Islamic countries where the primary governance mechanism is Sharia law 
(see Judge, 2010). This may contribute towards developing a global understanding of the relative 
effectiveness of disclosing stakeholder CG practices in comparative CG environments. 
Finally, whilst our findings are important and robust, some caveats are in order. We use a 
binary coding scheme which treats every CG disclosure mechanism as equally important. Whilst 
results based on our equally weighted and the alternatively weighted indices are essentially 
similar, future studies may enrich their analysis by constructing weighted and un-weighted CG 
disclosure indices. Also, due to data limitations, we use a limited number of alternative CG 
disclosure mechanisms in our endgogeneity or robustness analyses. As more data becomes 
available, future studies may need to introduce more mechanisms, such as data on the market for 
corporate control, in their analyses.     
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NOTES 
 
1. Bushman and Smith (2001), Core (2001), Dye (2001) and Healey and Palepu (2001) provide comprehensive reviews of 
the voluntary disclosure literature, especially on the economic consequences of disclosure, including CG practices.  
2. See Gamble and Kelly (2001), Schilling (2001), Vinten (2001), and Letza, Sun, and Kirkbride (2004), amongst others.  
3. For regulatory and capital structure reasons, as well as following prior research (Chen et al., 2010), the financial and 
utilities industries, with a total 111 listed firms, were excluded, leaving us with eight industries and 291 listed firms to 
be sampled. The industrial breakdown of this initial 291 sample is as follows: basic materials with 67 (23%) firms; 
consumer goods with 36 (12%) firms; consumer services with 62 (21%) firms; healthcare with 7 (3%) firms; industrials 
with 81 (28%) firms; oil & gas with 3 (1%) firms; technology with 31 (11%) firms; and telecoms with 4 (1%) firms. 
4. It takes time for the effects of CG disclosure practices to be reflected in firm value (Render et al., 2010). Hence, as part 
of our robustness checks aimed at avoiding endogenous link between firm value and the disclosure of CG practices, we 
introduce a one year lag between disclosing CG practices and firm value such that a firm’s value in any year (Qt) 
depends on the previous year’s CG disclosure practices (CGt-1), similar to Renders et al. (2010). The sample begins 
from 2002 because data coverage in the Perfect Information Database/DataStream on SA listed firms is very limited 
until 2002 and crucially because King II came into operation in 2002. 
5. For 94 of the 122 remaining firms, two or more years’ financial data and annual reports were not available in the 
DataStream/Perfect Information Database. For the other 28 firms, neither financial data nor annual reports were 
available. The industrial breakdown of our final 169 sample is as follows: basic materials with 33 (19%) firms; 
consumer goods with 24 (14%) firms; consumer services with 35 (21%) firms; healthcare with 3 (2%) firms; industrials 
with 51 (30%) firms; oil & gas with 1 (1%) firms; technology with 19 (11%) firms; and telecoms with 3 (2%) firms. 
Additionally, and due to lack of sufficient number of observations in three industries, namely health care, oil & gas, and 
telecoms industries with three, one and three listed firms, respectively, observations from these industries were merged 
with the closest remaining five major industries. As a result, the three healthcare firms were added to the consumer 
services industry, the one oil & gas firm was included in the basic materials industry, while the three telecoms 
companies were included in the technology industry. 
6. To test whether disclosing shareholder CG practices (CGSHARE) contributes more to firm value, we create two new 
CG disclosure variables as follows: CGSHARE_Dummy – a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the level of the 
CGSHARE is greater or equal to 80% (i.e., 33 out of 41), 0 otherwise; and an INT_TERM_Dummy – a variable created 
by interacting the CGSHARE_Dummy and CGSTAKE variables. Similarly, to test the impact of the different parts of the 
CGSHARE variable on firm value, we create four additional CG disclosure variables representing the four sections that 
form the CGSHARE as follows: CG disclosures relating to boards, directors and ownership (CGBDO); CG disclosures 
relating to accounting and auditing (CGAA); CG disclosures relating to risk management, internal audit and control 
(CGRMIAC); and CG disclosures relating to encouraging voluntary compliance and enforcement (CGEVCE). Also, and 
as part of our sensitivity analyses, we also include data available on four alternative CG mechanisms, including board 
size (BSIZE), block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN) and leverage (LEV). 
7. We follow Kraatz and Zajac (2001) and Guest (2009) in applying the mean-difference approach, which is more robust 
in the presence of hetereoscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 2003). However, we get similar results if we 
estimate our fixed-effects models by using the year dummy alternative instead of the mean-difference method. 
8. Since the correlation between the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE is relatively high, our evidence may be affected by the 
problem of multicollinearity, although the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests otherwise. We circumvent this problem by 
running Q on the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE iteratively without the controls in order to examine their respective 
explanatory power. The results suggest an adjusted R2 of 0.055 and 0.040 for the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE, 
respectively, consistent with our main finding that the CGSHARE contributes more to firm value than the CGSTAKE. 
9. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. Also, given that the average score for the CGSHARE is 69% (see 
Table 3), we consider 80% to be sufficiently high to indicate that a firm engages in increased disclosure of shareholder 
CG practices. However, we get similar results if we use other levels or truncations, such as using a relatively low 70% 
(i.e., 29 out of 41) or high 90% (i.e., 37 out of 41) level of the index.  
10. To clarify, and for brevity, we report both the lagged structure and 2SLS in the same table (i.e., Table 7) and therefore, 
to maintain consistency with the 2SLS variables, we apply a lead indicator on Q (Qt+1) to indicate the lagged structure 
instead of a lagged indicator on the CG disclosure practices (CGt-1) variables. 
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APPENDIX 
  
Full List of the South African Corporate Governance Index Disclosures Based on King II 
 
SECTION 1: COMPREHENSIVE BOARD, DIRECTORS AND OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURES 
 
1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are split. 
2. Whether the chairperson of the board is an independent non-executive director. 
3. Whether the board is composed by a majority of non-executive directors (NEDs). 
4. Whether the board meets at least four times in a year. 
5. Whether individual directors’ meetings record is disclosed. 
6. Whether directors are clearly classified into executive, NED, and independent. 
7. Whether chairperson’s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed. 
8. Whether CEO/MD’s performance and effectiveness is appraised and disclosed. 
9. Whether the board’s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed.  
10. Whether the board subcommittees’ performance and effectiveness is evaluated. 
11. Whether directors’ biography, experience and responsibilities are disclosed. 
12. Whether a policy that prohibits directors, officers and employees (insider) share dealings 
around the release of price sensitive information is disclosed. 
13. The existence of the office of company secretary. 
14. Whether a nomination committee has been established. 
15. Whether the nomination committee consists of a majority independent NEDs. 
16. Whether the chairperson of the nomination committee is an independent NED. 
17. Whether the membership of the nomination committee is disclosed. 
18. Whether the nomination committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
19. Whether a remuneration committee has been established. 
20. Whether the remuneration committee is constituted entirely by independent NEDs. 
21. Whether the chairperson of the remuneration committee is an independent NED. 
22. Whether the membership of the remuneration committee is disclosed. 
23. Whether the remuneration committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
24. Whether directors’ remuneration, interests, and share options are disclosed. 
25. Whether director remuneration philosophy and procedure is disclosed. 
26. Whether directors’ have access to free independent professional legal advice. 
27.  Whether share ownership by all insiders, including directors, officers, employees and 
employees’ trust is less than 50% of the total company shareholdings. 
 
SECTION 2: COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING DISCLOSURES 
 
28. Whether an audit committee has been established. 
29. Whether the audit committee is constituted by at least 2 independent NEDs with 
significant professional financial training and experience. 
30. Whether the chairperson of the audit committee is an independent NED. 
31. Whether the membership of the audit committee is disclosed. 
32. Whether the audit committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
33. Whether a board statement on the going-concern status of the firm is disclosed. 
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SECTION 3: COMPREHENSIVE RISK MANAGEMENT, INTERNAL AUDIT AND 
CONTROL DISCLOSURES 
 
34. Whether a risk management committee has been established. 
35. Whether the risk committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
36. Whether a narrative on both actual and potential future systematic and non-systematic 
risks is disclosed. 
37. Whether a narrative on existing internal control systems (including internal audit) is 
disclosed. 
38. Whether a narrative on how current and future assessed company risks will be managed is 
disclosed. 
 
SECTION 4: ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
39. Whether a positive statement on the compliance or non-compliance with the corporate 
governance provisions of King II is disclosed. 
40. Whether a narrative on how a firm is contributing towards the development of financial 
journalism is disclosed. 
41. Whether a narrative on what a firm is doing to encourage shareholder activism, like 
having investor relations department and proxy voting is disclosed. 
 
SECTION 5: INTEGRATED SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING (NON-FINANCIALS) 
 
42. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing the 
broad-based black economic empowerment and empowerment of women laws, including 
black equity ownership, preferential procurement, enterprise development, and executive 
management control is disclosed. 
43. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing 
employment equity laws in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and disabilities is disclosed. 
44. Whether a narrative on how a firm is addressing the threat posed by HIV/Aids pandemic 
in South Africa is disclosed. 
45. Whether a narrative on the actual measures taken by a firm to address occupational health 
and safety of its employees is disclosed. 
46. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing rules and 
regulations on the environment is disclosed.  
47. Whether a narrative on the existence of a code of ethics is disclosed. 
48. Whether a firm’s board is formed by at least 1 white and 1 non-white (board diversity on 
the basis of ethnicity) person. 
49. Whether a firm’s board is formed by at least 1 male and 1 female (board diversity on the 
basis of gender) person. 
50. Whether a narrative on the actual community support and other corporate social 
investments or responsibilities is disclosed. 
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Table 1 
A Summary Comparison of Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms of the Cadbury, King I and II Reports 
Governance Provisions 1992 Cadbury Report 1994 King Report (King I) 2002 King Report (King II) 
Boards and Directors: 
Board structure 
     Non-executive directors 
Independent non-exec. directors 
     Role duality 
Chairperson independence 
     Board meetings 
Board committees 
     Director/insider share dealings 
 
Unitary board 
     At least three 
At least two 
     Split chairperson and CEO 
Non-executive director 
     Frequently/Regularly 
Audit, remuneration & nomination 
Not specified  
 
Unitary board 
     At least two 
Not specified 
     Split Chairperson and CEO 
Non-executive director 
     At least once every quarter 
Audit & Remuneration 
     Not specified 
 
Unitary board 
     Majority of board members 
Majority of non-executive directors 
     Split Chairperson and CEO 
Independent non-executive director 
     At least once every quarter 
Audit, remuneration & nomination 
     Prohibits insider trading 
Risk management, internal audit 
and control: 
   Risk management 
        Internal audit 
   Internal control system 
 
 
Not covered 
     Establish internal audit function  
Establish internal control system
 
 
Not covered 
     Establish internal audit function 
Establish internal control system
 
 
Risk management/committee 
     Establish internal audit function 
Establish internal control system
Accounting and Auditing: 
   Auditing 
       Accounting/financial reporting 
 
Audit committee/auditors 
     Accounting standards (GAAP) 
 
Audit committee/auditors 
     Accounting standards (GAAP) 
 
Audit committee/internal auditor 
      Accounting standards (IFRS) 
Compliance and enforcement: Board, institutional/shareholders   
     and auditors  
Board, institutional shareholders  
     and Auditors 
Board, institutional/shareholders,  
     auditors, the courts, financial   
press, and peer pressure  
Integrated sustainability Reporting: 
   Ethics 
        Environment 
  Health and safety 
       Affirmative/employment equity 
  Black empowerment 
      HIV/AIDS 
 
Code of ethics 
     Not covered 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
 
Code of ethics 
     Environment 
Health and safety 
     Affirmative action 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
 
Code of ethics 
     Environment 
Health and safety 
     Employment equity 
Black empowerment 
     HIV 
Code Principles: Openness, integrity and    
     Accountability 
Accountability, fairness,  
     Responsibility and transparency 
Accountability, discipline, fairness,  
     independence, responsibility, 
social responsibility & transparency 
Kind of Corporate Governance: Financial aspects of governance Integrated corporate governance Inclusive corporate governance 
Compliance or Regulation: Voluntary or self-regulation Voluntary or self-regulation Voluntary or self-regulation
Notes: Compiled from the 1992 UK Cadbury Report and the 1994 (King I) and 2002 (King II) South African King Reports
 44 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Variables 
Firm Value/Alternative Firm Value Variables 
Q  Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.  
ROA   Percentage of operating profit to total assets. 
TSR  Percentage of total share returns made up of share price and dividends. 
Corporate Governance (CG)/Alternative CG Variables 
CGSHARE CG disclosure index containing 41 provisions from King II aimed at protecting 
shareholder interests that takes a value of 1 if each of the 41 CG provisions is disclosed in 
the annual report, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. These CG 
disclosure provisions are presented in Sections 1 to 4 of the Appendix. 
CGSTAKE CG disclosure index containing 9 provisions from King II that seeks to protect  
stakeholder interests that takes a value of 1 if each of the 9 CG provisions is disclosed in 
the annual report, 0 otherwise; scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. These CG 
disclosure provisions are presented in Section 5 of the Appendix. 
SACGI  CG index that combines the provisions contained in CGSHARE and CGSTAKE.  
CGBDO A sub-index of CGSHARE containing 27 CG disclosures relating to board, directors and  
ownership and scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. 
CGAA   A sub-index of CGSHARE containing 6 CG disclosures relating to accounting and  
auditing and scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. 
CGRMIAC  A sub-index of CGSHARE containing 5 CG disclosures relating to risk management, 
internal audit and control and scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. 
CGEVCE  A sub-index of CGSHARE containing 3 CG disclosures relating to encouraging 
voluntary compliance and enforcement and scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. 
CGSHARE_Dummy  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the level of the CGSHARE is 
greater or equal to 80%, 0 otherwise. 
INT_TERM_Dummy A variable created by interacting the CGSHARE_Dummy and CGSTAKE 
variables. 
BSIZE  Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
BLKOWN Percentage of ordinary shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company  
ordinary shareholdings. 
INSOWN  Percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional shareholders. 
LEV   Percentage of total debt to total assets. 
Control Variables 
BIG4  1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  
CAPEX  Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
CGCOM 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise 
CROSLIST 1, if a firm is listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
GEAR   Percentage of total debt to market value of equity.  
GROWTH Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. 
INDUST Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material + oil gas; consumer goods,  
consumer services + health care; industrials; and technology + telecoms firms. 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets. 
YD  Dummies for each of the five years from 2002 to 2006 and 2003 to 2007 inclusive, for  
             the main and robustness regression analyses, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of all Variables for all (845) Firm Years 
Variable               Mean               Median          Std. Dev.           Maximum      Minimum 
Panel A: Firm Value/Alternative Firm Value Variables 
Q                  1.55      1.33    0.68                 3.58              0.67  
ROA (%)             10.26    10.97  12.21    36.55           -23.19 
TSR (%)               33.57    29.60              48.68              173.41           -55.20 
Panel B: Corporate Governance (CG)/Alternative CG Variables 
CGSHARE (%)              59.74    60.98             18.59               97.56  4.88 
CGSTAKE (%)              68.67    77.78             27.40             100.00              0.00 
SACGI (%)               61.34    64.00             18.87               98.00              6.00 
CGBDO (%)   54.61    53.85             20.03                 100.00                7.69 
CGAA (%)                                  73.71                   83.33              24.46                 100.00                0.00 
CGRMIAC (%)   75.88    80.00              23.61                 100.00                0.00 
CGEVCE (%)   52.03    66.67              17.41                 100.00                0.00 
BSIZE                  9.75    10.00               3.67               18.00              4.00 
BLKOWN (%)              62.38    64.61             18.48               91.72            10.21 
INSOWN (%)               74.21    82.13             22.86               97.69              9.42  
LEV (%)               17.66    16.30             13.64               55.83              5.13 
Panel C: Control Variables 
BIG4 (%)              73.25              100.00  44.28  100.00              0.00 
CAPEX (%)              12.83      8.22  15.31    66.43              7.28 
CGCOM (%)              32.21      0.00  47.08  100.00              0.00 
CROSLIST (%)                       21.66      0.00  41.22  100.00              0.00 
GEAR (%)              32.14    17.62              30.81                78.31              1.36 
GROWTH (%)                        12.27    13.91  26.35              89.47           -44.21 
LNTA                 5.86      6.02    0.48      7.83              4.24 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), defined as the ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of equity to total assets. Return on assets (ROA), measured as the percentage of operating profit to total assets. Total share 
returns (TSR), refers to the percentage of total share returns made up of change in share price and dividends. Disclosure of 
shareholder CG practices (CGSHARE), refers to a CG disclosure index containing 41 provisions from King II aimed at protecting 
shareholder interests that takes a value of 1 if each of the 41 CG provisions is disclosed in the annual report, 0 otherwise and 
counts the number of the 41 CG provisions disclosed in the annual report; scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. These 
CG disclosure provisions are presented in Sections 1 to 4 of the Appendix. Disclosure of stakeholder CG practices (CGSTAKE), 
refers to a CG disclosure index containing 9 provisions from King II that seeks to protect stakeholder interests that takes a value 
of 1 if each of the 9 CG provisions is disclosed in the annual report, 0 otherwise and counts the number of the 9 CG provisions 
disclosed in the annual report; scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. These CG disclosure provisions are presented in 
Section 5 of the Appendix. South African CG disclosure index (SACGI), is a CG disclosure index that combines the provisions 
contained in the CGSHARE and CGSTAKE. CGBDO is a sub-index of CGSHARE containing 27 CG disclosures relating to board, 
directors and ownership and scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. CGAA is a sub-index of CGSHARE containing 6 CG 
disclosures relating to accounting and auditing and scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. CGRMIAC is a sub-index of 
CGSHARE containing 5 CG disclosures relating to risk management, internal audit and control and scaled to have a value 
between 0% and 100%. CGEVCE is a sub-index of CGSHARE containing 3 CG disclosures relating to encouraging voluntary 
compliance and enforcement and scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. Board size (BSIZE), is the natural log of the total 
number of directors on the board of a company. Block ownership (BLKOWN), is measured as the percentage of ordinary shares 
held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company ordinary shareholdings. Institutional ownership (INSOWN), defined as 
the percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional shareholders. Leverage (LEV), is the percentage of total debt to total assets. 
Audit firm size (BIG4), is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. Capital expenditure (CAPEX), is 
defined as the percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. The presence of a CG committee (CGCOM), is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has set up a CG committee, 0 otherwise. Cross-listing (CROSLIST), is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. Gearing (GEAR), is measured as the 
percentage of total debt to market value of equity. Sales growth (GROWTH), is defined as the percentage of current year’s sales 
minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales and firm size (LNTA), is measured as the natural log of total assets.  
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix of the Variables for all (845) Firm Years 
Variable             Q          SACGI     CGSTAKE    CGSHARE   BSIZE     BLKOWN   INSOWN    LEV      GROWTH      CAPEX      LNTA        GEAR         BIG4      CROSLIST 
Q        1.00               
 
SACGI           .32***      1.00                                  
 
CGSTAKE       .23***         .73***       1.00               
 
CGSHARE      .29***          .94***       .59***
 
     1.00
 
       
        
BSIZE              .13***         .58***       .51***  .55***     1.00             
 
BLKOWN       .06            -.18***       -.08†          -.20***          -.07
 
       1.00             
 
INSOWN        .16***         .31***        .32***  .26***           .28***        .37***      1.00
 
              
 
LEV               -.13***        -.00            .03  .01               .13***        .10*           .10*
 
       1.00                
 
GROWTH      .08†            .04            .09*           .08†              .09*            .03            .05           -.09*          1.00                
 
CAPEX        -.35***       -.20***       -.12***        -.11***          -.08†           .05           .08†           .32***         -.06           1.00                  
 
LNTA       -.10*            .53***        .51***         .58***            .50***        -.18***       .26***       -.13***          .12***         -.04         1.00                             
 
GEAR       -.38***        -.23***       -.18***        -.26***          -.08†            .05           .08†           .57***          -.07             .39***          -.04           1.00          
 
BIG4              .13***         .41***        .31***          .39***           .37***        -.06           .13***       -.03              .02             -.01               .42***             .08†   1.00        
 
CROSLIST    .20***         .40***        .38***          .35***           .37***        -.04           .18***        .04             -.01            -.10*             -.42***             .10*                .26***      1.00 
Notes: The table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients.  ***, **,  * and † denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed tests). Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), the South African CG disclosure index (SACGI), disclosure of stakeholder CG practices (CGSTAKE), disclosure of 
shareholder CG practices (CGSHARE), board size (BSIZE), block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), leverage (LEV), sales growth (GROWTH), capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), audit firm size (BIG4) and cross-listing (CROSLIST). Tables 2 and 3 provide the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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TABLE 5 
Effect of Governance-Practice Disclosure on Firm Value with Fixed-Effects Regressions   
    Model I   Model II  Model III  Model IV   Model V 
Dependent Variable                               Qt              Qt                                       Qt                                     Qt                                       Qt        
                             -------------------------------    -------------------------------   -------------------------------   -----------------------------     ----------------------------- 
Independent Variables      Coefficients     P-Values      Coefficients     P-Values     Coefficients     P-Values    Coefficients     P-Values    Coefficients     P-Values 
Governance Disclosures: 
     CGSHAREt                    0.007           (0.000)***           -      -            -                  -          0.009         (0.000)***            -      -           
     CGSTAKEt                       -  -        0.005            (0.000)***             -                     -           0.001          (0.160)            0.005             (0.004)**  
     SACGIt                       -                    -                       -                -                 0.009          (0.000)***              -                       -            -                       - 
     CGSHARE_Dummyt           -  -           -      -            -      -             -       -        0.290           (0.000)*** 
     INT_TERM_Dummyt          -  -           -      -            -      -             -       -        0.003           (0.020)* 
Controls: 
     BIG4t      0.180            (0.000)***         0.171             (0.003)**          0.186           (0.000)***          0.182           (0.000)***         0.165            (0.000)*** 
     CAPEXt     -0.025            (0.490)            -0.020            (0.504)          -0.037          (0.458)            -0.030          (0.475)         -0.117            (0.085)† 
     CGCOMt     -0.061            (0.439)            -0.059            (0.474)          -0.075          (0.396)            -0.034          (0.710)         -0.038            (0.697) 
     CROSLISTt      0.373            (0.000)***          0.367            (0.000)***        0.386          (0.000)***         0.310          (0.000)***        0.305           (0.000)*** 
     GEARt     -0.053            (0.260)       -0.032            (0.494)          -0.064          (0.315)            -0.046          (0.385)         -0.040            (0.412) 
     GROWTHt      0.178            (0.000)***          0.172            (0.000)***        0.189          (0.000)***         0.175           (0.000)***       0.184           (0.000)***                              
     LNTAt     -0.260            (0.000)***        -0.251            (0.000)***       -0.308          (0.000)***        -0.258           (0.000)***     -0.263           (0.000)*** 
     INDUST   Included   -     Included     -       Included     -       Included       -             Included      -  
     YD    Included   -     Included     -       Included     -       Included               -       Included      - 
Constant      1.879            (0.000)***          1.960            (0.000)***       2.137            (0.000)***         2.120          (0.000)***        2.264          (0.000)*** 
Standard Error                0.473                                      0.516                                   0.425                                  0.526                                  0.510 
Durbin-Watson                 2.140                                 2.051                                   2.308                                  2.234       2.250 
F-Value               15.907***                               14.013***                             17.020***                  13.530***                 15.473*** 
Adjusted R2                0.483                                 0.461       0.529                     0.440       0.458 
Number of Observations    845                      845          845                        845          845 
Notes: This table presents the estimated fixed-effects coefficients from five different models examining the effects of disclosing corporate governance (CG) practices on firm value 
as follows: Model I examines whether disclosing shareholder CG practices contributes to firm value; Model II investigates whether disclosing stakeholder CG practices contributes 
to firm value; Model III examines the overall effect of both disclosing shareholder and stakeholder CG practices on firm value; Model IV investigates whether disclosing 
shareholder or stakeholder CG practices contributes more to firm value; and Model V examines whether the value of disclosing stakeholder CG practices is particularly high for 
firms with high levels of shareholder CG disclosure practices. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), disclosure of shareholder CG practices (CGSHARE), disclosure of 
stakeholder CG practices (CGSTAKE), South African CG disclosure index (SACGI), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the presence of a CG committee 
(CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), gearing (GEAR), sales growth (GROWTH), firm size (LNTA), industry dummies (INDUST) and year dummies (YD). The 
CGSHARE_Dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the level of the CGSHARE is greater or equal to 80% (i.e., 33 out of 41), 0 otherwise, and the 
INT_TERM_Dummy is an interaction variable created by interacting the CGSHARE_Dummy and CGSTAKE variables. Tables 2 and 3 provide the full definitions of all the 
variables used. Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered standard errors technique. ***, **, * and 
† denote significance at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
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Table 6 
Effect of Shareholder Governance-Practice Disclosure on Firm Value with Fixed-Effects Regressions 
                           Model I               Model II               Model II               Model IV               Model V  
Dependent Variable                  Qt       Qt        Qt                     Qt        Qt 
                             -----------------------------     ------------------------------    ------------------------------    ------------------------------   ------------------------------ 
Independent Variables       Coefficients    P-Values     Coefficients     P-Values     Coefficients     P-Values    Coefficients     P-Values    Coefficients     P-Values 
Governance Disclosures: 
     CGBDOt      0.005          (0.000)***            -                 -                       -                  -          -  -        0.006          (0.000)***          
     CGAAt           -               -       0.003          (0.000)***            -                  -                    -                -        0.004          (0.015)*        
     CGRMIACt           -               -          -   -        0.003          (0.000)***          -                -        0.005          (0.000)*** 
     CGEVCEt           -               -          -   -           -                  -       0.001          (0.189)        0.001          (0.190) 
Controls: 
     BIG4t      0.125          (0.046)*             0.118          (0.070)†        0.123          (0.050)*              0.119         (0.085)†             0.140          (0.038)*  
     CAPEXt     -0.040          (0.780)      -0.033          (0.796)       -0.060          (0.602)           -0.030         (0.801)            -0.117          (0.089)†             
     CGCOMt     -0.036          (0.690)             -0.012          (0.878)            -0.032          (0.701)           -0.040          (0.625)            -0.084         (0.302) 
     CROSLISTt      0.250          (0.000)***       0.272          (0.000)***        0.298          (0.000)***         0.275          (0.000)***         0.270          (0.000)*** 
     GEARt     -0.041          (0.325)             -0.034          (0.485)            -0.050          (0.287)           -0.035          (0.479)            -0.038         (0.456) 
     GROWTHt      0.165          (0.000)***           0.163          (0.000)***          0.156          (0.000)***         0.160          (0.000)***         0.169          (0.000)***   
     LNTAt     -0.240          (0.000)***         -0.235          (0.000)***       -0.214          (0.000)***       -0.208          (0.000)***        -0.252          (0.000)*** 
     INDUST  Included               -                Included             -                Included              -               Included             -              Included             - 
     YD   Included              -                Included             -                Included              -               Included              -              Included             - 
Constant      1.172           (0.000)***          1.136           (0.000)***         1.128            (0.000)***       1.010           (0.000)***        1.214         (0.000)***              
Standard Error                                 0.562                                     0.603                                    0.618                                    0.620                                0.545 
Durbin-Watson                2.008                                     1.987                                    1.940                                     1.970                                2.120 
F-Value                9.946                                     9.368                                    8.925                                     8.563                              11.058 
Adjusted R2               0.350                                     0.340                                    0.338                                     0.326                                0.369 
Number of Observations                845                     845                       845                         845         845 
This table presents the estimated fixed-effects coefficients from five different models examining the effects of the different components of disclosing shareholder corporate 
governance (CG) practices (CGSHARE) on firm value as follows: Model I examines whether transparent board, director and ownership disclosure practices contributes to firm 
value; Model II investigates whether transparent accounting and auditing disclosure practices contributes to firm value; Model III examines whether transparent risk management, 
internal control and audit disclosure practices contributes to firm value; Model IV investigates whether transparent practices aimed at encouraging voluntary compliance with the 
CG disclosure rules contained in King II contributes to firm value; and Model V investigates which of the four components contributes more to firm value. Variables are defined as 
follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), CG disclosure provisions relating to board, directors and ownership (CGBDO), CG disclosure provisions relating to accounting and auditing (CGAA), CG 
disclosure provisions relating to risk management, internal audit and control (CGRMIAC), CG disclosure provisions relating to encouraging voluntary compliance and enforcement 
(CGEVCE),  audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), gearing (GEAR), sales growth 
(GROWTH), firm size (LNTA), industry dummies (INDUST) and year dummies (YD). The CG disclosure provisions contained in the CGBDO, CGAA, CGRMIAC and CGEVCE 
are specified in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Appendix, respectively. Tables 2 and 3 provide the full definitions of all the variables used. Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. 
Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered standard errors technique. ***, ** , * and † denote significance at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 7 
Effect of Governance-Practice Disclosure on Firm Value: Controlling for Endogeneity  
                  Lagged CG Disclosure Variables                                Two-Stage Least Squares 
                                     ----------------------------------------------------         ----------------------------------------------------- 
Dependent Variable Qt+1  Qt+1           Qt+1                   1st Stage (SACGIt)     2nd Stage (Qt) 
Independent Variables        (I)                         (II)                  (III)                                 (IV)                          (V) 
Governance Disclosures: 
     CGSHAREt              0.006***                    -                       -                                       -                              - 
                                        (0.000)                       -                       -                                       -                              - 
     CGSTAKEt                     -                         0.004**                 -                                       -                              - 
                                             -                        (0.006)                  -                                       -                              - 
     SACGIt/P_SACGIt         -                             -                    0.008***                                -                           0.011***                                  
     -                   -                  (0.000)                              -                          (0.000) 
     BSIZEt                                            -                                             -                                    -                                                  0.189***                       - 
                                             -                             -                       -                                  (0.000)                          - 
     BLKOWNt                      -                             -                       -                                  -0.112***                       - 
                                             -                             -                       -                                  (0.000)                          - 
     INSOWNt                       -                             -                        -                                   0.106***                       - 
                                             -                             -                       -                                   (0.000)                         - 
     LEVt                                -                             -                       -                                    0.080**                        - 
                                             -                             -                        -                                  (0.010)                         -                                          
Controls: 
     BIG4t                                           0.176***                0.165**                0.180***                          0.375***                   0.187*   
                                          (0.000)                 (0.007)               (0.000)                           (0.000)                    (0.033) 
     CAPEXt              -0.020                   -0.015                -0.030                              0.010                     -0.219* 
                                          (0.510)                 (0.539)               (0.480)                            (0.979)                   (0.017) 
     CGCOMt                      -0.046              -0.034                 -0.058                              0.268***                 -0.076 
               (0.491)                 (0.560)                (0.430)                           (0.000)                    (0.405) 
     CROSLISTt                0.359***                0.348***               0.362***                        0.345***                  0.318*** 
                                          (0.000)                 (0.000)                (0.000)                           (0.000)                   (0.000) 
     GEARt               -0.036                  -0.028                 -0.052                              0.019                     -0.047 
                                          (0.562)                 (0.519)                (0.349)                           (0.483)                    (0.396) 
     GROWTHt  0.169***                0.164***               0.182***                          0.078                       0.210*** 
                                          (0.000)                 (0.000)                (0.000)                           (0.254)                    (0.000) 
     LNTAt                          -0.245                  -0.232***              -0.280***                          0.295***                   0.278*** 
                                          (0.000)                 (0.000)                (0.000)                           (0.000)                     (0.000) 
     INDUST             Included            Included           Included                     Included         Included 
     YD              Included            Included           Included                     Included         Included 
Constant                             1.750***               1.639***                2.020***                         -0.486***                  0.498***                                  
                                          (0.000)                (0.000)                 (0.000)                           (0.000)                   (0.000) 
Standard Error                    0.490                  0.534                    0.449                              0.534                      0.560 
Durbin-Watson                  2.132                   1.986                    2.250                              2.497                      2.134 
F-Value                            13.695***             12.893***              15.740***                        16.109***                 11.685*** 
Adjusted R2  0.437                   0.429                   0.487                              0.538                       0.369 
Number of Observations       845                     845                      845                                  845                         845 
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from five different models examining the effect of corporate governance 
(CG) disclosure rules on firm value after taking into account potential endogeneity problems. Models I to III examine the effect 
of lagged shareholder, stakeholder and the overall CG disclosure indices on firm value, respectively. Models IV and V present 
the coefficients from the first and second stage estimations from a two-stage least squares, respectively. Variables are defined as 
follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), shareholder (CGSHARE), and stakeholder disclosure practices (CGSTAKE), South African CG 
disclosure index (SACGI)/predicted SACGI from Model IV (P_SACGI), board size (BSIZE), block ownership (BLKOWN), 
institutional ownership (INSOWN), leverage (LEV), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the presence of a CG 
committee (CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), gearing (GEAR), sales growth (GROWTH), firm size (LNTA), industry 
dummies (INDUST) and year dummies (YD). Tables 3 and 4 provide the full definitions of all the variables used. P-values are in 
the parenthesis. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered standard errors technique. ***, 
**
 
, * and † denote significance at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
